During the 1995 Ebola (EBO) epidemic in Kikwit, Demotional support team until the end of the epidemic. Difficulties in organizing the care of patients are discussed. cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 316 persons were diagnosed as having EBO hemorrhagic fever (EHF), and 80% died Methods [1] . It remains unclear when the EBO epidemic started in Kikwit, but in January 1995 a charcoal worker had already died Health care workers directly or indirectly involved in patientwith signs of EHF. For several months, the EHF cases remained care activities during the EBO epidemic were interviewed without undiagnosed. Initially, patients with hemorrhagic diarrhea were the use of standardized questionnaires. Nearly all physicians inconsidered to have Shigella infection [2] . By 10 April, the volved in patient care activities during the epidemic are co-authors of this paper. In addition, World Health Organization (WHO) docnumber of EHF cases increased rapidly due to the nosocomial uments and travel and meeting reports were screened for informatransmission of the infection after surgery was performed on tion about EHF care issues.
a laboratory technician at Kikwit General Hospital [3] . On 11 Between 15 and 19 September 1995, focus-group discussions May, an international scientific and technical committee was were conducted among 27 nurses who had worked with EBO established to control the epidemic [2] . patients in May 1995. Six (22%) of the 27 had been infected by In previous EBO outbreaks, patient care was relatively unorthe virus. There were 3-7 participants per group. The discussions ganized. In 1976, in Yambuku, DRC, most patients had already lasted between 1 h 50 min to 3 h. Many topics were discussed; died when the international team arrived [4] . During that epihowever, herein, we will report only on issues related to patient demic, only 3 patients with EHF were followed closely in a care. The discussions, which were led by the Congolese chaplain hospital setting (at the Ngaliema clinic in Kinshasa, DRC) [5] .
of Kikwit General Hospital, were recorded on tape.
In 1976, during the Sudan outbreaks, most patients were isoMost of the EHF patients were hospitalized at Kikwit General lated in their homes [6] . In Kikwit, for the first time, patient Hospital, a 350-bed facility, which is the main hospital of Kikwit.
care for a large number of patients took place in a hospital. In the more recent EBO outbreaks in Gabon, relatively good paResults tient care was organized, although on a smaller scale because Patient Care before the Diagnosis of EBO Was Made fewer persons were infected [7] .
Initially, patients with bloody diarrhea were treated with antibiotHerein, we describe the care of case patients before the infection was diagnosed as EBO, from the arrival of the internaics, such as chloramphenicol, cotrimoxazole, tetracycline, and nalidixic acid. Toward the end of the epidemic, ciprofloxacin was also used. Since the diagnosis of EHF was not suspected, adequate S269 JID 1999; 179 (Suppl 1) Ebola Patient Care, Kikwit, DRC technician became ill. Among the nurses was an Italian nun. tions of the patients and the working conditions of the health care workers had to be improved, however, in order to regain In the following 1 to 2 weeks, most of the sick health care the confidence of the population of Kikwit as well as the health workers died [1 -3] . The news about the death of the health care workers at Kikwit General Hospital. care workers at Kikwit General Hospital rapidly spread, not When the international team visited Kikwit General Hospital for only among patients and health care workers, but also among the first time, several dead bodies were found in the isolation ward. the population of the Kikwit region. This created great panic Abandoned EHF cases were also found in other wards, such as in and mistrust in Kikwit General Hospital, and nearly all patients the measles ward. The isolation ward was cleaned and disinfected fled. Some of them sought care in other hospitals, and others with calcium hypochlorite 2% [8] . Mattresses were covered with returned to their homes or villages. Health care workers also plastic shields to facilitate disinfection. Bodies of the deceased were left their posts. Only very ill patients and some voluntary health disinfected, put in plastic bags, and buried. All EHF cases were care workers remained in the hospital.
transferred to the isolation unit. With the logistic support of Méde-At the time of the nosocomial outbreak at Kikwit General cins sans Frontières (MSF), Belgium, the ward was reorganized Hospital, the hygienic working conditions in the hospital were and separated from the rest of the hospital by a plastic shield [8] . far from ideal. There was no running water, no electricity, and MSF also provided and maintained the supply of water through 2 no functional waste disposal system or latrines. For nursing inflatable tanks. Inside the hospitalization ward, a room was used for care and for most invasive procedures, gloves were not used.
stocking drugs, disinfectants, and nursing and protective equipment. Most nursing care was done by family members, who often Within the ward, most patients were in one room and often sepaslept in the same bed as the patient. On 4 May, before the rated by one or more empty beds. Only a few patients (some diagnosis of EBO was confirmed by the Centers for Disease of them health care workers of Kikwit General Hospital) were Control and Prevention (CDC), an isolation ward was created hospitalized in a private room. On 20 May, a second quarantine at Kikwit General Hospital in pavilion 3. One doctor (M.
pavilion was opened because an increasing number of patients was Bwaka) and 3 nurses volunteered to remain in isolation with expected. This ward, however, was only occasionally used for a the patients. They used gloves, surgical gowns, and locally few days. made cotton masks, but a minimal amount of protective equipProtective equipment was distributed according to the estimated ment was available. Thirty patients were admitted to this isolarisk of infection [8] . Physicians and nurses used double gloves, tion ward; however, little care was given to them. During this gowns, masks, goggles, and boots. Due to the hot climate, it was time, 1 of the 3 nurses became infected and died. One family nearly impossible to stay in the isolation unit for ú2 h. Because member per patient was allowed to enter the isolation unit, but the supplies were provided by different organizations, the kind of there was no strict control on the movement of family members protective equipment changed continuously. Very few high-security in and out of the unit. Some patients were visited by several masks were available during the epidemic. HEPA masks were only family members at the same time, and for other patients, the used by the medical personnel, and because of the limited supplies, family attendants changed over time. No protective equipment masks were reused. Goggles were difficult to wear because they was given to family members.
rapidly filled with perspiration; therefore, they were not always There were 164 cases of EBO reported before 11 May, of used. To limit the number of gloves needed for patient care and which, 134 (82%) died. Included in the total number of cases to decrease the risk of exposure to body fluids of EHF patients, were 63 health care workers, of whom 47 (75%) died.
physicians and nurses did not change gloves between patients but washed their gloved hands in calcium hypochlorite 0.2%. Cleaning
Patient Care after the Epidemic Was Recognized
personnel used kitchen gloves. Calcium hypochlorite (0.02%) was Initial weeks of the epidemic. The first priority was to stop used for hand washing. Each day, different concentrations of calthe epidemic. To avoid further nosocomial spread of the epicium hypochlorite were prepared in large tanks. demic, nearly all medical activities, except the care of the EBO Initially, only 1 Congolese physician and 1 expatriate physipatients, were stopped at Kikwit General Hospital. At the hospician worked in the isolation ward. All health care workers tal, only the emergency department continued functioning, and returned home after work. a few patients with tuberculosis remained in the tuberculosis After the establishment of the international committee, 93 ward. The maternity ward remained open in Kikwit II Hospital, persons with suspected EHF were admitted to Kikwit General a 100-bed facility that is located 1 km from Kikwit General Hospital. After barrier-nursing techniques were initiated, only Hospital, and some medical activity continued in private clinics.
3 health care workers developed EHF: 1 of them was an Italian The isolation unit. It was felt that in most cases, the isolanun, who was probably infected because barrier-nursing methtion of EBO patients at home would be impossible to organize ods were not always used, and 1 was a Congolese nurse, who and supervise in Kikwit, a city of Ç400,000 inhabitants. If was infected by a needlestick injury during recapping. It is people died of EBO at home, it was feared that certain families possible that these 2 people became infected just prior to the would continue to bury their family member in a traditional arrival of the international team. A second Congolese nurse, way, which would risk further spread of the infection [2] . It involved in the care of the Italian nun with EHF, always worked was therefore decided to continue isolating patients in the isolawith protective equipment but probably became infected by tion unit of Kikwit General Hospital. The hospitalization conditouching her eyes with a contaminated glove.
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Only a minimum of care was given to patients. Symptomatic Food for patients and family members was provided by a charity organization. In general, it was the family member who treatment included paracetamol for pain and fever; metoclopramide and haloperidol for nausea, vomiting, and hiccups; halohelped feed the patient. peridol and diazepam in cases of agitation; and diazepam for
The emergency ward (triage center). Patients with obvious epilepsy. Intramuscular injections and salicylic acid were not EBO symptoms and a history of contact with a known EHF given because of the potential risk of increased bleeding. Bepatient were hospitalized immediately in the isolation unit. cause laboratory tests were not available, patients with fever
Patients with suspected EBO sometimes remained in the emerwere often empirically treated with antibiotics and antimalaria gency department for observation for §24 h. Certain patients drugs. Medical records were kept for every patient, but in did not admit to having had a previous contact with an EBO general, little clinical information was noted in these records. patient or to experiencing certain symptoms, such as hemorrhagic manifestations, because they were afraid to be hospitalInitially, patients were given only oral treatments and did not receive infusions (with the exception of 2 Italian nuns, who were ized in the isolation unit. When it became obvious that they were infected with EBO (i.e., when they developed hemortreated in isolation in their convent). Despite the fact that all of the Italian nuns received infusions and good nursing care, all 6 rhagic manifestations), they were transferred to the isolation unit (figure 1). Patients who vomited or presented with diarrhea died (4 before and 2 after the arrival of the international team).
were also more rapidly transferred to the isolation unit because During the epidemic, all routine laboratory activities were they were considered more likely to transmit their infection to stopped at Kikwit General Hospital, and patient management deciother patients, family members, or health care workers. sions were taken only on a clinical basis. Because laboratory techniques for virus inactivation were not available on site, blood was
In the emergency department, it was difficult to separate suspected EBO cases from patients with other diseases, such obtained only for research purposes to allow analysis of samples in high-security laboratories after the epidemic was over.
as children with malaria or meningitis, because all diagnoses had to be made clinically since routine laboratory activities Essential nursing equipment (e.g., bedpans, urinals) were not had been stopped. No rapid diagnostic test to diagnose EBO initially available. Most of the nursing care was done by family infection was available on site. members. Protective equipment was also given to family members who cared for the sick (''gardes malades''), but not enough equipAll of the physicians and nurses involved in patient care activities who were interviewed found the presence of conjuncment was available at the beginning of the epidemic. Family members often were given only one pair of disposable gloves every 2 tivitis (''red eyes'') to be highly predictive for EHF; however, no systematic study was done [9] . Conjunctivitis can be obdays. From 17 May, a nurse who had recovered from EHF volunteered to provide extra assistance to family members and to train served during other viral diseases but is generally not present during malaria, typhoid fever, shigellosis, bacterial pneumonia, them in the proper use of protective equipment. Only 1 family member was allowed to stay with the patient. This person also had or meningitis (the main causes of serious acute febrile illnesses in Africa). At the end of the epidemic, an algorithm using to remain in isolation. Family members slept in tents that were erected close to the isolation unit by MSF [8] .
fever, conjunctivitis, and hemorrhagic manifestations as the Figure 1 . Admission and discharge process for patients suspected of having Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) at Kikwit General Hospital, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995. HS Å hemorrhagic signs (e.g., gum bleeding, hematemesis, melena or bloody stools, hematuria, petechia or hematoma, epistaxis, hemoptysis, metrorrhagia); NHS Å nonhemorrhagic signs and symptoms (asthenia, diarrhea, nausea or vomiting, anorexia, sore throat or dysphagia, abdominal pain, headache, arthralgia or myalgia, hiccups or cough, dyspnea or tachypnea).
Figure 2.
Proposed algorithm for diagnosis of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) using fever, conjunctivitis (red eyes), and contact with EHF patients as key determinants. HS Å hemorrhagic signs (e.g., gum bleeding, hematemesis, melena or bloody stools, hematuria, petechia or hematoma, epistaxis, hemoptysis, metrorrhagia); NHS Å nonhemorrhagic signs and symptoms (asthenia, diarrhea, nausea or vomiting, anorexia, sore throat or dysphagia, abdominal pain, headache, arthralgia or myalgia, hiccups or cough, dyspnea or tachypnea).
key symptoms or signs to detect EHF cases was proposed or by neighbors. After discharge, many convalescent patients were followed as outpatients at Kikwit General Hospital. (figure 2). However, this algorithm was never evaluated.
The emergency department consisted of 2 wards and a few Home care. When patients lived too far from Kikwit or when they refused to be transported to Kikwit General Hospital, consultation cubicles. One ward was used for suspected EBO cases and the other for suspected non-EBO cases (such as children with they remained in their homes. It was explained to the family that only 1 family member should take care of the patient. The malaria or meningitis). Since the 2 emergency wards were located close to the entrance to the hospital, it was difficult to keep family family was given 0.02% calcium hypochlorite solution and some gloves [9] . The team responsible for collecting regional members away from patients. Protective equipment was distributed to the health care workers in the emergency ward, and barrier-EBO surveillance data organized patient care for 60 EBO patients in 29 villages; 47 of the patients (78%) died. nursing techniques were used; however, they were applied less strictly than in the isolation unit. In addition, in the emergency Other health care. Several hospitals in the region used the example of Kikwit General Hospital to organize the care of ward, it was impossible to create ''infected'' and ''clean'' areas, as was done in the isolation unit [8] . Nevertheless, no cases of their EHF cases. At Mosango Hospital, a 600-bed hospital located 100 km from Kikwit, laboratory activities were reduced nosocomial-acquired EHF infection among patients or health care workers were identified. Initially, 2 Congolese and 1 expatriate and performed with increased precautions. Other medical activities, including emergency surgical interventions, continued physician worked in the emergency ward.
Ward for convalescent patients. When the clinical condition during the epidemic [10] . On 20 May, the International Scientific and Technical Committee decided to reopen the other of patients improved (i.e., when fever had disappeared and patients began to eat normally), they were moved from the isolation ward hospital in Kikwit (Kikwit II) in order to provide care for surgical, obstetric, and non-EBO emergency cases. Disinfecto a ward for convalescent patients. In this ward, isolation rules were less strict and more contact with family members or friends tant, waste disposal containers, and protective equipment were distributed in this hospital and also to 12 health centers in was possible. Surviving EBO patients spent an average of 15 days in the isolation ward and 20 days in the convalescence ward.
Kikwit and its surroundings [9] . Burial of patients. Red Cross volunteers were provided After discharge from the hospital, some patients returned to the convalescence ward because they were not well accepted at home with full protective clothing and trained to transport patients / 9d49$$se38 01-04-99 15:23:07 jinfal UC: J Infect and to bury the dead. The procedure was to disinfect the bodies, their houses, and some health care workers who had recovered from EHF had to return to Kikwit General Hospital because put them in plastic bags, and bury them in an individual or common grave. All patients who had died in Kikwit since the they were rejected by their community. The belongings (e.g., household furniture, clothes, linen, mattresses) of some convaestablishment of the international committee were buried by a special team of Red Cross volunteers, with one exception. This lescent nurses had been burned. They also suffered because they lost family members and colleagues during the epidemic. exception was near the end of the epidemic, when the body of a woman who died of EBO after childbirth was removed by Discussion force and taken home by family members and buried according to local customs. This event was responsible for the last wave Overall, the organization of patient care during the EBO epidemic in Kikwit was quite successful. The organization of an of EBO cases in Kikwit [1] . In the Mosango district, patients were buried by health care workers from Mosango Hospital.
isolation unit and of a triage center at the emergency ward of Kikwit General Hospital, together with the distribution of protec-
Last Weeks of the Epidemic
tive equipment among health care workers and family members, probably stopped the nosocomial EBO outbreak. Moreover, in The last wave of the epidemic consisted of 25 patients. At that time, enough protective equipment was available and its the last phase of the epidemic, the case fatality rate was reduced to 12.5% because of the improved patient care. distribution was well organized by MSF. Five Congolese physicians and 2 European physicians were involved at this point Organizing patient care was not easy. First there was the panic in the city and the fear among health care workers. Many of in the care of the last 9 patients hospitalized in the isolation unit of Kikwit General Hospital. By this time, physicians and their colleagues had died during the epidemic (of the 36 persons working in the emergency wards, 8 [22%] died). Hospital workers nurses had acquired more experience. The management of the patients was discussed daily and medical information about had not received any regular salary for several months prior to the start of the epidemic. Furthermore, the distribution of money patients was noted more rigorously, resulting in better patient care. Dehydrated patients were rehydrated by intravenous infuand of goods brought in by international and national donors created feelings of ill will and required subsequent reappraisal sions, using butterfly needles. Patients were also better nourished. Some of them received protein-rich liquid, which was by an advocacy group of nursing personnel. During the epidemic, there was also a brief strike by Red Cross volunteers. They too patiently spoon fed to them by relatives. Patients were examined twice daily by a physician. Blood pressure, however, was felt stigmatized by the population and complained of insufficient psychologic and financial support. The logistic support for the not taken systematically because it was not possible to disinfect the equipment properly. For the same reason, lung auscultation health care workers involved in care activities was not always ideal. Working with protective equipment in the tropics causes was performed only when there were clinical symptoms or signs suggesting a pulmonary or cardiac disorder.
excessive perspiration and a rapid loss of calories. Drinks and food should therefore be provided on a regular basis at the work When the nurse who had volunteered to take care of the last EBO-infected Italian nun also became infected, the Congolese site. Good logistic support is essential to allow health care workers to work in optimal conditions. Personnel management during physicians decided to transfuse her with blood from a convalescent patient. Because she recovered, it was decided to transfuse the future large EHF outbreaks will certainly face similar problems. Another problem was the lack of sufficient protective equipremaining EBO patients as well. One less severely ill patient refused to be transfused. In total, 8 patients received a transfusion ment at different times during the epidemic. Initially, it was unclear which and how much protective equipment was needed. with the blood donated by convalescent patients. Only 1 patient (12.5%) died [11] . Six of them also received intravenous infusions
The quantity of previously ordered equipment was not known, and workers did not know when to expect the supplies. Protective [11] . The last EHF patient was transferred out of the isolation unit on 14 July and was discharged from Kikwit General Hospital on equipment was supplied by different organizations. Despite the fact that the distribution of this equipment was coordinated by 31 July 1995. Of the last 25 patients with EHF, 14 (56%) died.
Focus-group discussions among nurses. It was revealed MSF, it remained difficult to monitor the use of the equipment and to foresee future needs. In general, these needs were always during discussions that most of the nurses who volunteered to care for EBO patients were very disappointed about the greater than estimated. There are several explanations for this. Because of their traumatic experience at the beginning of the recognition they received for their actions. Most of them felt abandoned by the managers of the hospital and felt they reepidemic, health care workers were afraid they were not protecting themselves enough, protective equipment was sometimes ceived insufficient financial and psychologic support during the epidemic. They had a very difficult time during the epidemic: misused by persons who were not at risk, and some equipment disappeared. To avoid these problems in the future, a better Salaries had not been paid over a long period, and the nurses felt stigmatized because people considered them to be possibly coordination of donor activities is necessary. From the start of an epidemic, ample quantities of gloves and gowns should be infected. Because their money was not accepted at the market, the nurses had to send other family members to obtain food.
supplied. Surplus material can always be used after the epidemic. During the epidemic, only butterfly needles were available for Some of them reported that neighbors had been throwing stones at them or their houses (or both). Others were chased from infusions. These needles are potentially traumatic and may cause S273 JID 1999; 179 (Suppl 1) Ebola Patient Care, Kikwit, DRC bleeding, especially in patients who become agitated. Plastic catheGood teamwork between physicians and nurses is essential ters are better for use in patients with bleeding disorders. If possito provide optimal care for patients and optimal adherence ble, high-security needles and catheters should be used so that to safety precautions (e.g., clinical and treatment information needlestick injuries can be avoided. Certainly, when no such neeshould be recorded by 2 persons, 1 person examining the patient dles are available, all needles should be disposed of immediately and the other taking notes, to avoid contamination of pencils after use in solid sharp containers.
and medical records with body fluids from patients). This will This epidemic has taught us a lot about the clinical management also lead to a better understanding of the disease. of EBO patients. The experience with the last 8 EHF patients, A comprehensive plan of action to organize EHF patient who were transfused with convalescent blood, suggests that, with care for future EBO outbreaks should be prepared. A manual adequate care, we should be able to decrease the case fatality rate about EHF isolation precautions has been compiled by the of this infection. These 8 patients were all seriously ill and had CDC and WHO [14] . clinical symptoms similar to those of other EHF cases seen during Planning for treatment of EHF cases and psychosocial supthe epidemic [11] . Virus isolates obtained at different times during port for patients and their families is necessary for the future. the epidemic were genetically identical [12] , as has been observed
The most important conclusion to be drawn from this epiin other epidemics [13] . It is therefore unlikely that these 8 patients demic is that unless we change the current weakness of the were part of a cohort with more favorable survival characteristics.
health care system in DRC (i.e., the lack of hygiene, laboratory Oral or intravenous rehydration, provision of adequate calories facilities, funds for health care workers, and epidemiologic through oral food intake, and possibly treatment with antibiotics surveillance activities), other nosocomial epidemics with EBO and antimalarial drugs to prevent infections are probably the most or other pathogens will undoubtedly occur. important measures to improve survival among EBO patients.
